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My ambition in this paper is to provide an examination of an unacknowledged example of blameless guilt that, I argue, merits further examination. The example is what I call carer guilt: guilt felt by nurses and family members caring for patients with palliative-care needs. Nurses and carers involved in palliative care often feel guilty about what they perceive as their failure to provide sufficient care for a patient. However in some cases the guilty carer does not think that he has the capacity to provide sufficient care; he has, in his view, done all he can. These carers cannot legitimately be blamed for failing to meet their own expectations, yet despite acknowledging their blamelessness they nonetheless feel guilty. My aims are threefold: first, to explicate the puzzling nature of the carer guilt phenomenon; second, to motivate the need to solve that puzzle; third, to give my own account of blameless guilt that can explain why carers feel guilty despite their blamelessness. In doing so I argue that the guilt experienced by carers is a legitimate case of guilt, and that with the right caveats it can be considered an appropriate response to the progressive deterioration of someone for whom we care.  

Section I - Introduction
Philosophical work on the emotion of guilt is replete with examples that depart from common or garden guilt. Say that our commonplace understanding of guilt is that it is an emotion we feel when we acknowledge we have done something morally wrong.​[2]​ Though this may be accurate of many examples of guilt feelings, it will often be wrong, or at least not quite precise enough. For example, guilt is prima facie appropriate as a response to malicious intentions even if we have not acted.​[3]​ Similarly, many cases cited in the literature are examples of nonmoral or blameless guilt i.e. cases in which a person feels guilty about something for which they cannot legitimately be blamed. Examples of this include collective guilt, survivor’s guilt, middle-class guilt, and guilt in moral dilemmas (I will cover these examples in greater detail in section IV). The problem posed by such cases for our common understanding of guilt is clear: if guilt is an emotion felt about things we have done wrong, how can it be appropriate when we cannot be blamed? 
Reflection on such examples is valuable for at least two reasons. First, when we consider these cases we are reminded of the complexity of the emotions that play an integral part of our moral lives. This complexity may not always give us reason to reconsider our moral concepts but sometimes it does, or at least it has often been argued it does.​[4]​ Greater awareness of the variety of guilt can at least mitigate against any risk of reductiveness when we attempt to categorise or abstract conceptual definition from individual guilt phenomena. If a theory of guilt cannot accommodate the varieties of guilt, then that theory has a problem to be addressed. Second, reflection on less usual examples of guilt allows us to better understand puzzling and sometimes troubling emotional phenomena through application of theories of guilt that have previously proved to be reliable. Thus if consideration of e.g. survivor’s guilt shows that this troublesome case is explicable by readily available theories of guilt, the value of the examination of survivor’s guilt lies not in its challenge to our theory but in our greater understanding of the phenomenon.
My ambition in this paper is to provide an examination of an uncommon guilt phenomenon that is at least valuable in the second way, and thereby add to the list of less usual guilt phenomena a heretofore unacknowledged example that merits further examination. The phenomenon I examine I will refer to as carer guilt: guilt felt by nurses and family members caring for patients with palliative-care needs.​[5]​ Nurses and family carers involved in palliative care often feel guilty about what they perceive as their failure to provide sufficient care for a patient. However in some cases the guilty carer does not think that he has the capacity to provide sufficient care; he has done all he can. In such cases carers cannot legitimately be blamed for failing to meet their own expectations, yet despite acknowledging their blamelessness they nonetheless feel guilty. As such, carer guilt is an instance of blameless guilt that ought to puzzle us as much as other, previously examined cases of blameless guilt. 
My aims are threefold. First, I aim to explicate the puzzling nature of the carer guilt phenomenon. In section II I will recount empirical studies to establish some of the detail of these cases, and abstract from this detail a tension in our natural response to carer guilt that renders its appropriateness prima facie ambiguous. My second aim is to motivate the need to further explain this ambiguity. In section III I will respond to ways in which one might explain away, rather than solve, the puzzle of carer guilt, and in section IV I will consider and reject the possibility of using extant accounts of blameless guilt to explain carer guilt. My third aim (setion V) is to give my own account of blameless guilt – drawing on Gabriele Taylor’s theory of guilt as perceived corruption of moral status – that can explain why carers feel guilty despite their blamelessness. In doing so I hope to show that the guilt experienced by carers is a legitimate case of guilt, and that with the right caveats it can be considered an appropriate response to the progressive deterioration of someone for whom we care.  

Section II – Carer guilt
Guilt is a common occurrence in health- and social-care for elderly or terminally-ill patients. Many studies of the emotional impact on families and healthcare professionals recount experiences of guilt alongside problems with depression, anxiety, and powerlessness. Guilt occurs in a very broad range of care situations.​[6]​ In this paper I will focus exclusively on a subset of carers’ experiences of guilt.​[7]​ Some carers feel guilty about what they perceive to be their failure to provide sufficient care for a loved one or patient.​[8]​ Some nurses report feeling guilty when they can no longer provide sufficient care for a patient and must hand over to palliative care specialists (De Bal et al, 2006, p.594). Guilt among family caregivers is particularly common when the carer’s loved one moves into a care or nursing home (Butcher et al, 2001; Hennings et al, 2013; Paun et al, 2015). 
Although the finer details of their guilt vary from carer to carer, we can identify a significant feature common to many. Studies of the emotional burden shouldered by nurses show that they feel bound by a duty to provide sufficient care for the patient even when their ability to provide care is limited by factors out of their control (e.g. institutional constraints or lack of resources and training; see for instance Kain 2007). Perhaps most striking is the guilt felt by some nurses when their patients are transferred to palliative healthcare (De Bal et al., 2006, p.594). While institutional limitations can be corrected, transferring a patient to palliative care is an indication that the illness has progressed beyond the capacity of non-specialist medical teams. Through no fault of their own, nurses can find themselves unable to provide sufficient care for a patient whose medical condition has become too challenging. When this happens, some nurses feel guilty about falling short of what they expect from themselves.
Family carers will also sometimes feel guilty about failing to cope with the demands of caring, and the move to a residential care facility that results from this inability to cope (Hennings et al, 2013). These same carers do not believe that they have the ability to prevent the patient’s move to a care facility. Often the carers’ inability to do the right thing feels inevitable (Butcher et al, 2001); their loved one’s illness has progressed to the point where they can no longer provide the sufficient level of care. Nonetheless, the perceived failure to provide care, and the resulting home-move for the loved one, can be an object of profound guilt for a carer.
In these cases a nurse or carer feels guilty about what they think is their failure to provide sufficient care, despite the fact they also believe they have done everything in their power to alleviate the suffering of their patient or loved one. I will use the shorthand “carer guilt” to refer to these cases of guilt. 
With this description of carer guilt we already have in view the puzzling nature of the phenomenon, on which I will focus throughout this paper. Carers and nurses in these cases believe they are responsible for providing a certain level of care. Evidently, the care they are providing does not meet the standard of care ºthey expect of themselves. The object of carer guilt is thus a failure to meet a perceived duty of care. Yet the carers who in interview express guilt about not providing sufficient care also explain in these same interviews that they believe themselves incapable of doing more (Butcher et al, 2001; Smallegan, 1985). These carers thus feel guilty about failing to discharge a responsibility that, at least prima facie, they are incapable of meeting.
Given these carers cannot do what they expect of themselves, we might question whether their guilt is appropriate. Indeed, two salient features of these cases give us reason to think their guilt is misplaced. First, if we take for granted that the carers have done everything in their power to help their loved one or patient, it would be undoubtedly inappropriate for others to blame them for the patient’s suffering. Equally, it would be inappropriate for anyone to feel indignant or resentful towards these carers. But given it is commonplace to think of guilt as suited only to those same wrongdoings to which resentment and indignation are also suited, the fact we would be wrong to blame or resent these carers indicates that the carers may be wrong to feel guilt. 
Perhaps these carers are wrong to think that they could not do more, or think they have more of a choice than they are willing to admit, in which case blame might be appropriate after all. But while this may be true of some carers, it is unlikely this will explain every case. Elderly spouses in particular are faced with a situation in which providing care for their loved one goes beyond their physical capacity. At least some bearers of carer guilt will sincerely and accurately believe they cannot do more.
Second, it is likely that those who support carers – their family, friends, counsellors etc. – will be inclined to counsel the carer out of their feelings of guilt. Doing so may involve telling the carer that the situation is not her fault, that she has done everything she can to help, and that she should not blame herself. If this response to the carer’s guilt is right, we have reason to think that this guilt is misplaced. Both the fact that we would be wrong to resent the carers, and the way their loved ones will counsel them out of their guilt, can be explained by the fact that these carers are blameless. 
Nonetheless, carer guilt is not so easily dismissed as inappropriate. As I will cover in greater detail in section III, guilt is not a self-evidently inappropriate response to the carer’s situation. Consider, for instance, Herbert Morris’ approach to other cases of blameless guilt, (or in his terms, ‘nonmoral guilt’):
[I]f individuals experience guilt in nonmoral situations as an inevitable by-product of what we regard not necessarily as an obligatory but nevertheless as a perfectly acceptable, even perhaps admirable stance toward the world, I have thought this reason to regard the feeling as appropriate. Views of moral reality differ, and when this difference manifests itself in differences in emotional experiences, we are justified, I believe, in according the feeling a respectful response. (Morris, 1987, p.225)
I take Morris’ approach to be appropriate also to carer guilt. Consider also the role that guilt plays in imperfect virtue. The imperfectly virtuous life is led by someone whose character disposes that person to, inter alia, respond ethically when their conduct falls short of that of a moral saint (see Greenspan, 1994). Guilt’s role in imperfect virtue ordinarily appears when a person is culpable for wrongdoing; when I act badly, it would be virtuous to feel guilty about that. Note that this is different from saying that if I act badly I ought to feel guilty.​[9]​ We need only say that when I commit a wrong it would be good of me to feel bad about that, not that I ought to. 
Do the same considerations apply to the carer situation? Certainly it would be unduly moralistic to insist that any carer who has not done enough to alleviate the suffering of a patient ought to feel guilty regardless of whether it was within their power to do so. But carer guilt is, I suggest, at least a candidate for imperfect virtue. For would we not think the person who feels indifferent about the fact he can no longer take care of his loved one less virtuous than she who feels guilty about the same? Indeed we may even go so far as to hope that if we were in a similar situation to these cases that we too would feel at least some guilt. My suggestion is that if carer guilt is, like other instances of guilt, a display of imperfect virtue, it is an appropriate response to the situation at least insofar as it is a virtuous response.
The above considerations do not show conclusively whether carer guilt is appropriate or inappropriate. My ambition for the moment is not to settle this matter (though by the end of the paper I will have offered a more conclusive account of the appropriateness of carer guilt). For now I wish only to adduce evidence of an ambiguity in carer guilt’s appropriateness that I believe is worthy of further explanation. 
Section III – Is there really a problem?
Perhaps carer guilt is not as mysterious as I am suggesting. One might, for instance, dismiss carer guilt as irrational guilt, and thereby no more puzzling than any other instance of irrational guilt. But the available accounts of irrational emotions, including irrational guilt, do not adequately explain carer guilt. An oft-cited example of irrational guilt is that felt by a person who once accepted religious prohibitions, no longer does so, yet nonetheless feels guilty when they transgress those prohibitions (e.g. Rawls, 1971 p.422; Wallace, 1994 p.43). The guilt in such a case is irrational because it conflicts with the person’s currently held moral beliefs, and is explained only through his irrational adherence to an ethical code he no longer accepts. Emotions such as this that resist changes in the agent’s beliefs are sometimes described as recalcitrant (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2003). 
Carer guilt is unlike such clear-cut cases of recalcitrant guilt because the carers do not accept that their perceived shortcomings are justified (hence the efforts of those attempting to convince them otherwise), nor is their belief that they have acted unjustly caused solely by habitual adherence to an ethical principle. There is no conflict for carers between their considered ethical judgements and their emotional response to the situation. 
But perhaps carer guilt’s recalcitrance lies instead in its appraisal of the carer’s capacity to provide care. Perhaps in carer guilt a person emotionally construes the situation as one in which she could have done more, despite her considered judgement that she could not (much as in irrational fears one emotionally construes a situation as threatening despite considered judgement concluding otherwise). We might then say that the carer’s guilt is irrational insofar as it resists his beliefs about what he can do. Is such a recalcitrance apparent in cases of carer guilt? 
In addition to the above-cited interviewees explicitly confirming they believe they could do no more (the reliability of these statements are admittedly open to doubt), we have reason to think this specific form of emotional recalcitrance is implausible. The emotional construal that “I could have done more” is much more complex than the recalcitrant negative-evaluation experienced by the irrationally guilty former religious-devotee. Disgust in response to e.g. extramarital sex is a plausible candidate for recalcitrance if that response has been cultivated in the relevant way. But emotional construal of one’s abilities as a carer involves complex assessment of oneself, one’s situation, and one’s causal role in the situation, as well as consideration of a counter-factual statement (“had I done more for my husband, he would not have moved home”).​[10]​ The reason that carer guilt is unlikely to be recalcitrant is that if it were so, it would require the implausible scenario of a carer engaging in an assessment of himself and his situation that is at once cognitively demanding and yet immune to his considered judgement.  
	Perhaps instead we are inclined to explain away the problem by suggesting that these carers have mistaken shame for guilt. This mistake is not uncommon, and poses a challenge to empirical work on guilt to ensure that participant responses are not misleading (see Tangney and Dearing, 2002, especially chapters 2 and 3). If this challenge has not been adequately met by the studies I have cited, the problem of carer guilt may disappear; carer shame would be much less puzzling than carer guilt, because shame is an emotion that we may be made to feel about things for which we cannot be blamed (e.g. class or physical appearance). 
Some philosophical literature holds that shame is felt about our shortcomings – failure to meet an ethical standard – whereas guilt is felt about wrongdoings – failure to properly exercise our agency (e.g. Joyce, 2006: p.102). Some of the psychological literature shows that shame focuses on the self whereas guilt focuses on a particular action or effect (Tangney and Dearing 2002, p.25). Powerlessness is also a distinctive phenomenological feature of shame (ibid). Insofar as the carers describe emotions that are felt about shortcomings, incapacity, and powerlessness, it appears those emotions are better described as shame.
	The carers nonetheless exhibit many distinguishing features of guilt. When feeling guilty we want to make amends for our wrongdoing in a way that we do not when ashamed (Joyce, 2006). This is true of many carers; their anxieties about visiting their loved one often enough after a care-home move indicate that these carers feel a debt that needs to be repaid (Hennings et al., 2013). Unlike guilt, shame is indexed to how we imagine ourselves to be perceived by others (Tangney and Dearing, 2002, p.21). But not only is carer guilt independent of the moral assessments of others, it will often persist even when others tell the carer they are not to blame. According to some guilt is felt about harms against others, whereas shame is felt when we fail to fully realise excellences (e.g. Rawls, 1971: pp.386-391 and pp.420-425). And these carers indicate guilt insofar as they believe they have failed to meet a duty to provide care for others.
The carers thus report hallmark features of both shame and guilt. It appears that they feel both. Thus carers who experience carer guilt feel ashamed of their limited ability to provide care, and feel guilty about the failure that results from this limited ability. This should not be surprising; as Rawls notes, the same action can give rise to more than one moral emotion (Rawls, 1971, p.422). Nor is this a problem for my argument. I argue these carers feel guilty about their perceived failure, not that they do not also feel shame. 
Perhaps the carers confuse guilt with a third emotion sometimes referred to as ‘agent regret’. Consider the following. A pedestrian trips and falls into the path of a passing car. The car hits the pedestrian, and the pedestrian is killed in the collision. The car’s driver did not see the pedestrian, and was not driving dangerously. The driver accepts this version of events, accepts that she is not to blame, yet feels guilty.​[11]​ In Williams’ account of the traffic accident, the emotion felt by the driver is best described as agent regret rather than guilt because the driver’s contribution to the pedestrian’s death was unintentional. Williams thus carves out space for a distinct emotion, neither regret nor guilt, felt by someone who has played an integral but unintended role in a regrettable outcome.​[12]​ 
Is carer guilt in fact carer agent-regret? Both the driver and the carer respond emotionally to the unintentional causal role they play in a regrettable outcome. But the two are significantly different insofar as in the case of the driver the thought that he could have done differently, and would have done had he known what will happen, is a central feature of his distinct species of regret (1981, p.30). This partial agency in the case of the driver – the power to have altered the outcome – helps us explain why the driver feels differently to a mere bystander. But the same power to have altered the outcome is lacking in the case of carers. Indeed, central to the problem I have explicated above is the fact that these carers are fully aware of the consequences of their conduct for the wellbeing of their loved one, and have done everything in their power to prevent something they would regret. These carers do not have the partial agency attributable to someone who bears agent regret. It is precisely this lack of agency that renders the carers blameless, and thereby makes their guilt puzzling. 
Section IV – Other cases of guilt without blame
I hope to have done enough to show that carer guilt is a problematic instance of guilt without blame and worthy of further explanation. But this is not the only case of guilt without blame, and many other similar cases have been discussed in philosophical literature on guilt. Might existing accounts of other cases of guilt without blame help us explain carer guilt?​[13]​
a.	Collective guilt
As a UK citizen I might plausibly feel guilty about UK military intervention in Iraq even if I have not participated in the war.​[14]​ In such a case my guilt is about something for which, arguably, I cannot justifiably be blamed (assuming I have done everything in my power to prevent the war). According to Margaret Gilbert (1997, 2002), such cases are best understood as collective guilt: guilt felt about an act perpetrated by a collective of which I am a member, rather than an act perpetrated by me individually. Gilbert maintains I can think both that I have not personally acted in Iraq and nonetheless that we – in this case, the nation – have, and thereby hold a thought about collective blameworthiness that is independent of personal culpability. In this respect, Margaret Gilbert’s account of collective guilt might be equipped to explain guilt without personal blame when the relevant collective, of which the guilt bearer is a member, is responsible for wrongdoing.
It is likely that some carers feel collective guilt. Some neonatal nurses, for instance, report guilt about not doing what is morally required because of institutional limitations (Kain 2007); such nurses may feel guilty about what they believe to be preventable suffering for which their collective is culpable, even if they are not personally to blame. Similarly a family member might identify as a member of a collective that is responsible for care – a community of relatives, friends, and care professionals – and feel guilty when that collective is blameworthy, even if the carer qua individual is not.
However, it is likely that at least some of those who experience carer guilt will think their situation is not just out of their control but also out of control of the care community. The illnesses involved in the studies I have cited (e.g. cancer, dementia) are progressive, and irreversible. These are illnesses that force professionals and families to the limits of what they can do through no fault of their own. This applies just as much to the collective that is responsible for care as it does to the individual. The language of inevitability used by some of the interviewees cited above indicates they agree (e.g. Smallegan, 1985). Given that those who bear carer guilt believe that they are both personally and collectively powerless to provide sufficient care, the concept of collective guilt will not help us explain the problem of blameless carer guilt. 
b.	Privilege guilt and survivor guilt 
Those who benefit from unearned privilege, by virtue of their class, gender, or race, will sometimes feel guilty about the unjust suffering of those without privilege. The “middle-class guilt” phenomenon is a version of this; guilt is felt by many – and some may argue, should be felt – who are at least prima facie unjustly privileged but not blameworthy. We might be tempted to deny that it is ever possible to be sufficiently blameless when one is unjustly privileged, but some have found this dismissal of blameless privilege-guilt unpersuasive.
Herbert Morris has suggested that what I am calling privilege guilt is a genuine case of guilt without blame (1987, p.236). Morris proposes that privilege guilt is not always or wholly a response to culpable failure to redress inequity, but instead at least in part a moral reaction to the bare fact that I benefit where others do not without justification. He suggests that this guilt is explained by an identification we make with those whose unjust suffering prompts our guilt (1987, pp.236-237). According to Morris, guilt can be a natural and legitimate response to a situation in which one sees that someone with whom one feels a bond of solidarity suffers a misfortune that one does not, without any reason for this inequality. For Morris, this explanation of privilege guilt extends to survivor guilt​[15]​; both are emotional responses to having benefited where those with whom we identify have unjustly suffered. 
Morris’ treatment of privilege guilt does not give us a way around the problem of carer guilt. In some cases of carer guilt a carer will continue to feel guilty even after their loved one has access to specialised palliative-care that is significantly more successful at meeting the needs of the patient (De Bal et al., 2006, p.594; Hennings et al, 2013, p.686). One of the most curious features of carer guilt is that it can be resistant to improvement in the wellbeing of the sick loved one. Even after a person has been transferred to palliative-care specialists, a carer or nurse previously responsible to that person can continue to feel guilty about the fact that it is not he or she who is providing the necessary care. Thus though the unjust suffering of someone with whom we identity may be enough to explain privilege guilt, this salient feature of the latter is not always present in carer guilt.
c.	Dilemma guilt

Considerable attention has been paid to the dilemma and subsequent guilt felt by the titular character in William Styron’s Sophie’s Choice. Sophie, sent to a concentration camp, is told on arrival that one of her two children will be executed. Sophie is asked to choose one of her children for death. If she does not choose, both will be killed. Grant for the sake of argument that there is no moral reason to prefer the survival of one child over that of the other (could there be such a reason?). Sophie has no course of action available that is not prohibited; choosing either child or neither violates her responsibility as a mother. Sophie cannot reasonably be blamed for such a violation given the circumstances, and resentment and indignation towards her would be unwarranted. Nonetheless, the guilt that plagues her thereafter is far from unexpected.​[16]​
According to Patricia Greenspan, Sophie’s dilemma warrants guilt even if guilt would not be warranted in some similar yet significantly different cases (Greenspan, 1983). Sophie’s case is different from, for instance, the case of a doctor who can only treat one of two patients both of whom need the doctor’s intervention to survive, because the doctor’s choice will only force her to fail to discharge the duty to treat the other patient, and will not force her to perform a prohibited act. Contrast this with Sophie’s options, each morally prohibited actions. Sophie’s choice is also different from other dilemmas in which all options are prohibited actions but there is overriding reason to prefer one wrongdoing to another (e.g. breaking a promise by ‘withholding weapons from someone who has gone mad’; Greenspan, 1983 p.117). Sophie has no reason to choose one option over another. For Greenspan, the fact that choosing to hand over her daughter for murder is an option among others for Sophie, coupled with the fact that this is undeniably a morally prohibited act without an overriding reason that Sophie can appeal to, is enough to warrant Sophie’s guilt. 
The significant difference between Sophie’s case and the carer’s case is the option to have done otherwise. Sophie’s blamelessness can be explained by the fact that each of the options available to her are equally wrong, but her guilt can nonetheless be explained by the agency she exercises in choosing between available options. Unlike Sophie, the omission that occasions carer guilt – failure to provide sufficient care – is not an option that is chosen, but an inevitable outcome of limited abilities. The agency evident in Sophie’s case – essential to the complicity in her daughter’s death forced on her by the doctor – is not a feature of the carer case.
d.	Causal responsibility

In her account of guilt Gabriele Taylor attempts to make space for two emotions that I have already covered: agent regret and privilege guilt (Taylor, 1985, p.91). To accommodate both, Taylor relaxes the responsibility requirement operative in our everyday understanding of guilt and maintains that a person need only think of herself as causally responsible for a regrettable outcome in order to feel guilty about it. This eliminates the need for the guilt bearer to be intentionally related to the negative event (accommodating the driver case) or indeed to have acted at all (accommodating privilege guilt). If we subscribe to Taylor’s more accommodating analysis of the responsibility we feel in guilt, then the blamelessness of guilty carers ceases to be a problem. 
But this feature of Taylor’s account allows too much. Depending on how we articulate the concept of causal relation to injustices, we might find ourselves in a position to feel guilty about a great range of the world’s problems about which it would be arguably absurd to feel guilty. To give just one example: it could be said that I am causally related to the election of Donald Trump, insofar as I might have long ago moved to the United States, obtained the right to vote, and voted for Hillary Clinton. Guilt in such a case is, I submit, inappropriate. The problem is that our account of the sense of responsibility integral to guilt must be able to distinguish between those omissions that are causally related to regrettable outcomes, and those omissions that constitute failure to act in a such a way that might mitigate those regrettable outcomes. Both kinds of omission meet Taylor’s standard of causal responsibility, but only the latter are proper objects of guilt. We must ask ourselves what makes a carer’s omission of sufficient care for the patient a failure, rather than simply a causally relevant absence of action.

Section V – Explaining carer guilt

Though Gabriele Taylor’s treatment of responsibility in guilt feelings has a problem, there is another crucial feature of her account of guilt with which I concur, and which will help us understand carer guilt. Taylor observes that guilt is an emotion of self-assessment, and as such is distinct from remorse (1985, pp. 97-107). Whereas remorse is, at least commonly, felt about a wrongdoing I have committed, guilt is ordinarily what I feel about myself when I have wronged. Guilt is, more specifically, an emotion in which I take myself to have been altered by my wrongdoing; from the perspective of guilt my error stays with me as a persistent corruption of my moral status, until I do something – e.g. making amends with the wronged – to restore myself to my previous moral standing.​[17]​ 
Our perception of ourselves as being corrupted in this way can be prompted by a number of things, including our own freely undertaken moral transgressions. But the crucial difference between Taylor’s account of guilt and some standard definitions​[18]​ is that the latter maintain that only a person’s freely undertaken wrongdoing can cause appropriate guilt, whereas Taylor’s approach allows us to include cases of guilt caused by other phenomena. The examples of guilt without blame considered in the previous section show us the range of phenomena that can legitimately prompt us to question our moral standing. When a collective of which I am a member is to blame for harm or injustice, I may believe that all members of that collective including myself are tarnished by the collective wrongdoing, even if I have not acted personally in a blameworthy fashion. Equally, events other than freely undertaken actions – either my own or those of my collective – can prompt me to question my moral standing. This much is evident in cases of privilege guilt. As Morris observed, unjust distribution of harm between me and others can threaten our bond of solidarity. But what Morris did not observe, and what Taylor’s account of guilt helps us see, is that the emotion we feel when this bond breaks is a form of guilt – as opposed to, say, regret for a lost relationship – only when the situation undermines my moral standing. Privilege guilt may do this by, for instance, undermining the moral worth I attach to solidarity with those with whom I identify.​[19]​  
The case of dilemma guilt in Sophie’s Choice also demonstrates the possibility that an event out of our control can threaten our moral status. The horror of Sophie’s situation is partly that the concentration camp doctor forces her to jeopardise her own innocence. Thanks to the ultimatum he imposes Sophie cannot but do wrong, which means that through no fault of her own she must act in a way that diminishes her moral standing. To make matters worse, just as Sophie’s moral standing is corrupted by her choice so too is her virtue as a parent. Sophie’s guilt is a response to her coerced transgression qua moral agent, but it is also a response to her having acted contrary to a parent’s duty of care to their child. In this respect, an external imposition corrupts Sophie’s standing as a moral agent as well as her status in a more specific social role. 
Sophie’s diminished moral status – as mother, rather than just moral agent – is reminiscent of the case of carer guilt. Carers in the situations described above experience an ethical demand to provide care for a patient or loved one. This is a demand they may recognise as universal; they may think that all of us ought to help alleviate the suffering of vulnerable people. But this is also a demand they will recognise as binding in virtue of the more specific relationship they have to the patient. Thus spouses who experience carer guilt are likely to think that they are responsible for the wellbeing of their husband or wife because the demand to ensure that wellbeing is an integral feature of their loving and caring relationship.
The guilt the carers feel can be understood as a response to an external threat to their moral standing qua carer. Take for example guilt felt by elderly spouses (Hennings et al., 2013). As a couple ages, deteriorations in health can threaten their ability to discharge the duty of care that they self-ascribe. The contingencies of ageing can prevent a person from living up to the expectations they have of themselves as a carer. When a person in such a situation feels guilty about not doing enough to alleviate the suffering of the other, it is because in their view their status as a loving husband or wife has been put into question. This explains why carer guilt is found in a particularly acute form when a patient must move to a residential care facility, or to a palliative care unit (ibid); it is at this point that the needs of the patient have clearly surpassed the ability of those previously charged with caring for that patient. Just as Sophie has been forced into a position in which she cannot meet the expectations she has of herself as a parent, so too carers can find themselves forced by changes of circumstance – commonly the unpreventable decline of their loved one’s health – into a position in which they can no longer meet their expectations of themselves as a caring spouse, parent, child, sibling, or friend. Mutatis mutandis, we can bring the same explanation to bear on the blameless guilt of professional carers, nurses, and others with duties of care to patients. 
Carers could have a number of reasons for thinking that their moral status is partly determined by their success in caring for their loved one or patient. For professional carers and nurses, this may be a matter of professional duty. Informal carers (particularly spouses) may feel they have made a promise or commitment to care, and that failing to make good on that promise amounts to a betrayal of their loved one.​[20]​ Some carers may think that the demand on them to care for another is generated simply by the fact that their familial social, or professional relationship with a person in need puts them in a unique position to respond to that person’s suffering, and that this encounter with another’s vulnerability is enough to generate an ethical demand. Whatever the reason, those who experience carer guilt display a conviction that they are responsible for the other’s wellbeing, and that failing to discharge that responsibility diminishes their moral standing.
This way of understanding the carers’ moral psychology helps us see why carers’ blamelessness is not a self-evidently overriding factor when considering whether their guilt is appropriate. If guilt is an emotion of self-assessment that responds to a perceived corruption of moral standing, including external factors that impose that corruption on the agent, then guilt can be appropriate even if the guilty party is not culpable for that which has threatened their innocence. In the case of carer guilt, the threat to moral standing is also a threat to their familial or professional role, which can be prompted by culpable wrongdoing but also by a change in circumstances for which the carer ought not to be blamed. The explanatory factor for carer guilt is not what they can or cannot be blamed for, but rather whether they can continue to meet the expectations constitutive to being the parent, partner, sibling, friend, or health professional that they have been previously. In these cases an inability to continue successfully in the role of carer would be enough to warrant the feeling of guilt, even if the carer is not a legitimate target for the blame of others. 
It may seem that I am arguing that guilt is appropriate to these carers’ situations. It may even seem that I am arguing not only that it is appropriate, but that carers in these situations should feel guilty. But this is not my position. To clarify, I will distinguish between three ways an emotion can be appropriate to a given situation. First, an emotion is morally appropriate in a given situation if there are moral reasons to feel it in that situation (say, remorse when I have committed immoral acts; see D’Arms and Jacobson, 2000). Second, an emotion is intelligible in a given situation if the agent has justifying reasons to feel the emotion in that situation, or roughly speaking, if the emotion “makes sense” from the perspective of the agent. Third, an emotion is suited to the situation if the situation in fact has the characteristics appropriate to the emotion. Thus, for example, a person’s fear could be intelligible yet unsuited to a situation if they mistakenly believe there is something frightening nearby. Equally, a person might have moral reasons to not be afraid even when fear is both intelligible and suited to the situation e.g. if that fear obstructs the efforts of a firefighter to deal with dangers that threatens the safety of others.​[21]​
In a weak sense of moral propriety carer guilt is morally appropriate; that is, there is no moral reason prohibiting guilt in the carer’s situation. In other words, we could not legitimately tell a carer they ought not to feel guilty on moral grounds. Indeed, as I have suggested in section III, carer guilt plays a role in imperfect virtue similar to that of other cases of guilt; it is a sign of virtuous character in a morally imperfect life. However in a stronger sense of an emotion’s moral propriety guilt is not morally appropriate; that is, guilt is not morally demanded by the situation. Nor does my analysis of carer guilt give us any reason to think that a carer would do wrong by not feeling guilty.
Is carer guilt intelligible? These carers subscribe to a duty of care to their loved one or patient, a duty they associate with the social role to which they subscribe. Their inability to meet this duty diminishes, in their view, their status as a carer, and thereby their moral standing. If, as I have suggested, we follow Gabriele Taylor in understanding guilt as a response to diminished moral standing, then the carers have justifying reasons to see their situation as warranting guilt. Given these crucial features of the moral psychology of the carers under discussion here, their guilt is intelligible.
Does guilt suit the carers’ situations? This depends on whether their construal of their situation is accurate. If we cannot find fault with how a guilty carer perceives their relation to the patient, their social role, the expectations of that role, and their success or failure in meeting those expectations, then we must conclude that their guilt is not only intelligible but also suitable. 
It is clear, I suggest, that these carers have a mostly accurate grasp of their moral circumstances. But one significant feature of their construal of the situation remains questionable: their understanding of what it would be to successfully meet the duty of care they have to their loved one or patient. What we know of the carers who experience carer guilt indicates that they interpret their duty of care as a duty that has not been adequately discharged unless the patient is either without suffering, or succeeds in coping with their suffering, because of the carer’s actions. If the carer did not understand their duty of care in this way then the patient’s suffering or failure to cope with suffering would not prompt guilt because the carer would not think their duties transgressed. Similarly, if the carer did not understand their duty of care in this way then a patient’s transfer to a palliative-care team would not prompt guilt (De Bal et al., 2006, p.594). The carer must think that his duty of care requires that he plays a significant role in the relief of suffering for the patient in order for guilt in these circumstances to be intelligible.​[22]​ 
But it is not clear that the duty of care that comes with being a family carer or healthcare professional is, as the carers appear to believe, a duty to be a significant causal factor in making a patient sufficiently comfortable with their suffering. Perhaps these carers are making a mistake by focussing on the outcomes of their conduct, rather than the nature of the conduct itself. As a parent, sibling, or friend we are expected to love and care for the other, and to act in a way that sincerely expresses that care. If our loved one suffers, we are expected to respond to that suffering with compassion and empathy, offering support and palliation. But we do not fail in this responsibility if the loved one is unhappy or in pain because successfully meeting this responsibility does not depend on the wellbeing of the other. 
I do not mean to establish conclusively whether the carers are right in their construal of their duty of care. I remain agnostic on this point. My ambitions in this paper have been more limited: to argue that carer guilt is a legitimate case of guilt without blame; to show that carer guilt is a case worthy of further analysis; and to explain our conflicting intuitions about carer guilt’s appropriateness. I have argued that many available accounts of other cases of blameless guilt fail to fully explain the particulars of carer guilt, but that Gabriele Taylor’s account of guilt as a response to diminished moral standing can be used to explain how a carer can experience a legitimate case of blameless guilt. Regarding whether carer guilt is appropriate, my concluding position is thus: carer guilt is morally appropriate in a weak sense (virtuous but not required); carer guilt is intelligible; and carer guilt is suitable only if we agree with the carers that their duty to care is a duty to provide a certain outcome for their loved one or patient.  
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^1	  Acknowledgements: I am grateful to a large number of readers of earlier versions of this paper, including colleagues at the University of Essex. Particular thanks go to Matteo Falomi, the Ethics of Powerlessness project team, and Bill Wringe for his encouraging words at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association.
^2	  This might be an inaccurate rendering of a commonplace understanding of guilt. Perhaps there is no such thing as a common understanding of guilt. Nothing in my argument hangs on this.
^3	  Morris, 1987
^4	  Better known examples of this include Bernard William’s reflections on guilt, shame, and agent regret, and what that tells us about agency, responsibility, moral luck, and related moral concepts. See Williams, 1981, 1992.
^5	  In this paper “palliative care” refers to the significant health- and social-care required to manage chronic- and terminal-illness, often but not always as a result of ageing.
^6	  Sometimes carers feel guilty about (arguably) culpable wrongdoing. For example, some parents of terminally-ill children feel guilty for entertaining thoughts of greater freedom after their child dies (Steele and Davies, 2006).
^7	  Unless otherwise stipulated I will use the term ‘carer’ very broadly to refer to informal caregivers (including family members), and health- and social-care professionals.
^8	  By ‘provide sufficient care’ I mean doing what is required to ensure a patient is comfortable with their symptoms. This could involve a variety of actions, from prompting a person to take medication to helping a person dress, bathe, and eat. Care provision is thus distinct from ‘caring’ as a psychological state (caring about someone) or as a supportive interaction (caring for someone).
^9	  There is a discussion to be had about whether situations in which guilt is virtuous and those in which it is obligated must be coextensive. My analysis of carer guilt has ramifications for that discussion, for which I do not have the space to explore in this paper. 
^10	  For more on the additional cognition required for ‘self-conscious’ emotions like guilt see Barrett, 1995.
^11	  Example adapted from Bernard Williams (1981, ‘Moral Luck’).
^12	  See also Williams, 1992.
^13	  Note that I neither accept nor reject any of the existing explanations of other cases considered in this section. My aim is to show that even if any of these accounts succeed in explaining other cases, they do not succeed with carer guilt. Whether or not they succeed on their own terms does not bear on my argument. 
^14	  This example is adapted from that used by Margaret Gilbert (1997).
^15	  By survivor guilt I mean guilt felt by those who have shared the experience of a tragedy or atrocity with others who have suffered much more from the experience. Examples include guilt felt by many who survived the Holocaust. For an attempt to explain survivor guilt see Sondergaard Christensen, 2013. The problem with Sondergaard Christensen’s account, and the reason it will not help us explain carer guilt, is similar to that regarding Gabriele Taylor’s account covered later in this section: it allows too much. For if we agree survivor guilt is appropriate because it is the ‘manifestation of a permanent condition of human existence’ (2013, p.375), then we are committed to accepting all human situations as sufficient warrant for survivor guilt.
^16	  Sophie’s guilt has, I believe, been mischaracterised in discussions of her in moral philosophy. Sophie’s guilt is complicated by the fact that she has also been complicit in a number of other wrongdoings, all of which are forced on her in different ways, before and in Auschwitz. Nonetheless, interpreting Sophie’s Choice accurately not a condition for successfully accounting for a case of dilemma guilt adapted from the novel. 
^17	  By moral standing I mean that which we determine when we judge whether someone ought to make amends for an injustice. I understand this to be a threshold judgement, such that it is appropriate to talk of someone being of sufficient moral standing to be judged innocent and thereby not required to make amends. Greater or lesser degrees of moral standing may be determined by what one has done, mitigating circumstances, the extent to which one’s character is virtuous, and factors external to one’s agency discussed in this section.
^18	  E.g. Stephen Darwall: ‘To feel guilty is to feel as if one is appropriately blamed (to blame) and held responsible for something one has done’ (2006, p.71).
^19	  Using Taylor’s theory of guilt to fully explain privilege guilt, or indeed any of the cases of blameless guilt other than carer guilt, requires further reflection than I have space for here. 
^20	  I owe this suggestion to two anonymous reviewers, to whom I am grateful for prompting me to think more about why carers think they have a duty to their loved one or patient. 
^21	  For more on the distinction between intelligible and suited emotions see Teroni, 2007. Teroni´s terminology is “intelligibility” and “correctness”. I use “suitability” to remain neutral between judgementalist and non-judgementalist theories of emotion.
^22	  Note again the distinction Taylor makes between remorse and guilt (1985, 97-107); in such cases the carers may not feel remorse if the palliative team who has assumed responsibility for the patient is succeeding where others have failed, but may still feel guilty for having failed to do this themselves. In the terms of the analysis above, we could say that a nurse can think his status as care provider is diminished to the point of guilt even when sufficient care is provided for the patient by someone else.
